

Curriculum Vitae

Benjamin McMyler

Contact Information

Department of Philosophy
Texas A&M University
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Professional Appointments

Texas A&M University, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy (2008-present)

Education

University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy (Ph. D. 2008)
Beloit College (B.A. 2000, *summa cum laude*)

Areas of Specialization

Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Areas of Competence

Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, History of Modern Philosophy, Wittgenstein

Publications

Books:

- *Testimony, Trust, and Authority*, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

Journal Articles:

- “Doxastic Coercion,” forthcoming in *Philosophical Quarterly*.
- “The Epistemic Significance of Address,” forthcoming in *Synthese*.
- “Responsibility for Testimonial Belief,” forthcoming in *Erkenntnis*.
- “Knowing at Second Hand,” *Inquiry*, Vol. 50, No. 5 (Oct. 2007), 511-540.

Book Chapters

- “Believing What the Man Says About His Own Feelings,” forthcoming in *New Essays on the Philosophy of J. L. Austin*, eds. Martin Gustafsson and Richard Sørli, Oxford University Press.

Work in Progress

- “Anarchism and Authoritative Reasons”
- “Indoctrination, Education, and Coercion”

Papers Presented

- “The Epistemic Significance of Address,” Texas A&M University (December 2009)
- “Responsibility for Testimonial Belief,” National Autonomous University of Mexico (October 2009), Free University of Amsterdam (August 2009)
- “Authority, Evidence, and Second-Personal Reasons for Belief,” University of Texas Pan-American (December 2008, invited), University of Memphis (February 2008), Texas A&M University (January 2008)
- “Three Models of Epistemic Dependence,” Texas A&M University (September 2008)
- “Trust as a Cognitive Attitude,” University of Chicago (April 2007)
- “A Case for Irreducibly Second-Personal Epistemic Reasons,” University of Chicago (March 2007)
- “A Testimonial Account of Lying,” University of Chicago (January 2007)
- “Believing What the Man Says About His Own Feelings,” University of Chicago (March 2006)
- “McDowell on Hearsay,” University of Chicago (May 2005)
- “Knowing at Second Hand,” Free University of Amsterdam (February 2004)

Awards

- Finalist for Council of Graduate Schools/ProQuest UMI Distinguished Dissertation Award in the Humanities and Fine Arts (2009)
- Lee Prize (best graduate essay in theoretical philosophy), University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy (2006)
- Manley Thompson Prize (best 3rd year graduate essay), University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy (2004)
- Phi Beta Kappa, Beloit College (1999)

Fellowships

- Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Dissertation-Year Fellowship (2006-2007)
- University of Chicago Fellowship (2001-2006)
- David L. Boren Graduate International Fellowship (2000-2001)

Teaching Experience (Full responsibility for course design and execution)

- *Speech Acts and Communication* (graduate course), Texas A&M University (Spring 2011)
- *Introduction to Philosophy*, Texas A&M University (Spring 2011)
- *Self-Knowledge and First-Person Authority* (graduate course), Texas A&M University (Spring 210)
- *Philosophy of Mind*, Texas A&M University (Fall 2009)
- *Epistemic Agency* (graduate course), Texas A&M University (Spring 2009)
- *Theory of Knowledge*, Texas A&M University (Fall 2008, Fall 2009, Spring 2010)
- *Other Minds*, University of Chicago (Spring 2008)
- *The Sociality of Mind* (tutorial), University of Chicago (Winter 2006)

Dissertation

Title: *Trusting Others for the Truth: An Essay on the Epistemology of Testimony*

Committee: James Conant (chair), David Finkelstein, Michael Kremer, Josef Stern

Brief Abstract: Epistemologists typically liken the epistemic credentials of knowledge and belief based on testimony to the credentials of knowledge and belief based on either perception or inference. I argue that such accounts cannot adequately explain the way in which testimonial knowledge is distinctively secondhand in virtue of being justified by the authority of a speaker. I present an alternative, essentially interpersonal account of the epistemology of testimony according to which testimony amounts to a *sui generis*, second-personal reason for belief; and I examine how such an account bears on broader issues concerning the role of the second person in human cognition.

*Nominated by the University of Chicago for the 2009 Council of Graduate Schools/ProQuest UMI Distinguished Dissertation Award in the Humanities and Fine Arts; one of five finalists for the national award

References

- *James Conant*, Chester D. Tripp Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago: jconant@uchicago.edu
- *David Finkelstein*, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago: davidf@uchicago.edu
- *Michael Kremer*, Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago: kremer@uchicago.edu
- *Josef Stern*, William H. Colvin Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago: j06s@uchicago.edu
- *Linda Zagzebski*, Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, George Lynn Cross Research Professor, University of Oklahoma: lzagzebski@ou.edu