Although philosophers have devoted much attention to the moral status of non-human animals since the 1970s, almost nothing has been written on conceptual and normative issues regarding pet animals specifically. In this paper, I discuss Deborah Barnbaum's analysis of what it means to be a pet and I go on to distinguish among "companion animals" (who receive the care and affection owners typically give to pets, but who also have significant social interaction with their owners and would voluntarily choose to stay, in part for the sake of this companionship), "domesticated partners" (companion animals who also work with humans in ways that emphasize and exercise the pets' mental and/or physical faculties in healthy ways), and "mere pets" (which fail to be either companion animals or domesticated partners). I then discuss Bernard Rollin's, Keith Burgess-Jackson's, and David DeGrazia's characterizations of the basis and content of owners' obligations to their pets. I conclude that the keeping of animals incapable of being more than "mere pets" is justified if their biological needs are met as well or better than they would be in the wild, that (other things being equal) it is better to keep a domesticated partner or a companion animal than a mere pet, and that pet owners should cultivate a domestic partnership with their companion animals to the extent practicable.

Keywords: Ethics, animal welfare, pets, companion animals

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