11. Human passions are thus forms of motion--namely, motions of other bodies that move my body. Appetites and aversions determine what we are moved toward (as good) and what we are moved away from (as evil) in our effort (endeavor, conatus) to exist. Imagination identifies probable consequences (in terms of causal sequences) in deliberation (which is called "de-liberation" because it eliminates options for acting). Will is the final act of deliberation that precedes "voluntary actions." The will is of course determined by the strongest of the motive forces, so it makes no sense to say there is free will, only free actions (that is, acts that result from our willing them). We are free insofar as we are able to do what we want, but we are not free to will other than we will, for that would mean that we are indifferent and thus not even determinate selves.
12. Civil philosophy resolves the human condition into the motions of equal individuals who are motivated by competition, mistrust, and glory. Every individual has a natural right to all things (even the bodies of others) and to the satisfaction of personal drives. Conflict due to scarce resources, private interests, thinking they are better than others, misuse of language, showing off, and the artificiality of their covenant leads to mutual fear, which in turn drives humans into a covenant in which a common power establishes laws and the possibility of justice/injustice (political society). The passion of self-preservation thus prompts one to leave the state of nature, a state of war in which there are no objective moral distinctions, no property (propria): it is a dictate of "reason" to do so.
(Note difference with Locke: for Locke, the state of nature is not necessarily one of scarce resources, so conflict is not inevitable. Social existence is useful but not essential. This is closer to what Hobbes sees in small families, who are motivated by "natural lust," feelings that cannot be the basis of a political science. Love or respect are not trustworthy enough as political motivations for large groups--men as citizens--even if they are the passions that work best insofar as human beings are human.)
13. The dictates of right reason, rational preservation, or egoistic prudence include natural laws (obligations or restrictions on our natural liberty--the absence of external impediments) to strive for peace, to lay down one's natural rights to achieve it voluntarily (i.e., consistent with what one sees as promoting his/her own good), and to keep covenants. These rules identify the conditions under which the transition from the state of natural war (atomic individualism) to organized society becomes intelligible. They are rooted in the dynamics of human nature itself, not in divine decree (for there is no natural knowledge of an afterlife). To cede one's rights is to let another become the spokesman for oneself. But since the whole purpose of such an act is to protect one's life, no one can be understood to give up his/her right to life, and so if one's life is threatened by even a just government, one is always justified in resisting it.
14. In order to ensure that human beings keep covenants (which identify what it means for something to be just and binding), the sovereign is given the power to intimidate and coerce compliance to his dictates. Covenants are valid only if there is a sovereign able to compel compliance; otherwise, one is able to do what he/she can get away with (according to natural right). Propriety depends on the existence of the commonwealth, so there is no injustice or "ownership" apart from a commonwealth. Other laws of nature include: (4) no one should have reason to regret giving up rights; (5) people ought to be sociable; (6) we should forgive those who repent; and (7) punishment should not be to get revenge but to correct the offender and to direct others.
15. Ants, bees, and other sociable animals do not compete for honor, their private good is the same as the common good, they lack reason and thus do not identify fault with common administration, they lack language to confuse what is good, they do not confuse actual harm ("damage") from unjust harm ("injury"), and their agreement is natural and not, as with men, only by consent to allow one will to be theirs. We have an "aptness to society" based on our natural diversity: society is made for beings so much in need of it.
16. The sovereign (which could be more than one man who does not have to be a hereditary king identified by some divine right) is not a party to the covenant, for if he were there would have to be some power that could coerce him to abide by his word (which, of course, there is not). The sovereign attains power either by natural force (acquisition) or by voluntary agreement (institution). Either way, a commonwealth is formed in the "person" of the sovereign who is "authored" by all of the members or "subjects" (or authors) of the contract. The "authority" of the sovereign is thus the will of the subjects themselves. It is impossible for the sovereign to do anything contrary to the will of his subjects, since his authority is really an expression of their will to be a community. Though the sovereign might do something sinful, he cannot do any injury or injustice. Anyone who punishes a sovereign punishes someone else for acts that he himself authorizes and commits.
17. Because the sovereign is God's visible representative, no one can say that either he or the sovereign has a covenant with God. Therefore, no one can say that a covenant with God takes priority over that by which he/she is bound to the sovereign. The sovereign's will is the will of the people to avoid war, so what he says is what they must want, individually and collectively. The people are a people, united as a person, in virtue of the sovereign; the society and the sovereign come into being simultaneously. So the sovereign cannot justly be punished or overthrown by his subjects. Those who do not consent to form the commonwealth are justly excluded from its protection, and those who share in its protection give their consent tacitly.
18. The sovereign decides whatever is conducive to or averse to peace, and insofar as that which promotes peace (the decision of the sovereign about what is proper and who should hold what place in society) is in accord with the law of nature to seek peace, no decision of the sovereign is against the law of nature. Even a seemingly bad sovereign is better than none at all. Only if the sovereign cannot exercise power are subjects returned to the state of nature and are then free to do what they want while fearing for their lives.
19. Liberty: In civil society, an action is "free" insofar as someone (or any body in motion) can do what he/it "wants" without interference or external impediment (this applies to inanimate things as well). Threats do not take away from one's freedom, nor is liberty inconsistent with necessity, for whatever is what one wills (or is inclined to do to survive) is done freely as long as nothing prevents the person/body from acting on that inclination or decision. Insofar as an individual "acts" in accord with its will, he is free (even though what an individual is or what will, passion, or appetite he has is necessitated or "disposed" by God). But it is not God who acts in that situation, but the individual.
20. Without a sovereign, there is always the possibility of interference by others; so the dictates of the sovereign, and the fear of punishment, frees people from the fear of interference from others. The subject can do whatever he/she wants in matters not regulated by the sovereign. But the sovereign can decide to regulate anything he wants, even religious beliefs and other matters of conscience. Conscience is a threat to the political order, unless it endorses the will of the sovereign (the civil law, the public conscience, the measure of good and evil). In those matters that cannot be transferred by covenant (e.g., self-survival), every subject retains liberty.