Past Test Questions: Truth

 

Answers at end. Because these questions draw on different textbooks and topics covered in different semesters, not all of them apply to any particular course in a semester.

True/False (True=A, False=B)

1.       When I say I know something, I do not always have to believe what I claim to know.

2.       Just as it is impossible to know something that you don't believe, you cannot believe something you don't know.

3.       Even though only true propositions can be known, it is possible to believe a proposition that is false.

4.    We cannot know something that is false, because what is false does not exist (i.e., it is nothing), and to know nothing is the same as not knowing.

5.    Gettier problems highlight the fact that it is possible to know something without having to believe it.

6.    "Gettier problems" identify instances where people truly know something but do not have justified true beliefs.

7.    For correspondence theorists (e.g., Russell), facts in the world are true or false, not the beliefs about them.

8.    Because Eastern (e.g., Indian) theorists deny the existence of facts independent of our consciousness, they uniformly reject correspondence theories of truth in favor of coherence theories.

9.    According to the correspondence theory of truth (such as that adopted by Russell), only facts are true.

10.    According to the correspondence theory of truth, a statement is true if it is consistent with our other beliefs.

11.    According to the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it is consistent with our other beliefs, even if those beliefs do not represent or match facts in the world.

12.    A statement is true, according to the coherence theory of truth, if it is consistent with facts in the world that are independent of our beliefs.

13.    According to the coherence theory, the truth of a proposition consists in its coherence with other beliefs or propositions.

14.    According to the coherence theory of truth, a statement is true if it is consistent with facts in the world that are independent of our beliefs.

15.    Because coherence theorists and pragmatists disagree about what it means to say that a proposition (e.g., "the lights are on") is true, they also have to disagree about whether that proposition is true.

16.    In William James' pragmatic theory of truth, a belief is validated, verified, or produces satisfactory results--in short, it works--because it describes the way things really are.

17.    In the pragmatic theory of truth developed by James and Dewey, a belief is true because it "works" or produces expected results.

18.    According to James's pragmatism, a proposition is true if, when acted upon, it satisfies our expectations.

19.    According to Richard Rorty, to say that a proposition is true means that we have no reason to doubt it.

20.    Scientific instrumentalists claim that theoretical entities such as gravity or electrons do not really exist but are useful in predicting what will happen when we do certain experiments.

21.    According to cognitive realists (or "correspondence theorists") such as Bertrand Russell, a proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact that exists independently of its being thought by anyone.

22.    Scientific realists argue that theories can make accurate predictions only because the theories describe the way things in the world really are.

23.    By claiming that scientific theories allow us merely to predict future observations, conceptual relativists deny that theoretical entities (e.g., electrons) are meaningful concepts.

24.    Because cognitive realists and cognitive relativists differ on what it means to say that a statement is true, they would also necessarily differ on which statements are true and which are false.

25.    According to cognitive relativism, agreement about what is true—what Rorty calls social solidarity—is achievable because truth is independent of human beings.

 26.    Because hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of words and actions, it does not address questions about whether such interpretations are true.

27.    According to Wittgenstein's early approach to language, it is possible to create an ideal language that expresses facts about the world in a clear and unambiguous way.

28.    In Wittgenstein's later doctrine of "meaning as use," the meaning of a text can vary depending on how people interpret it in their life activities.

29.    For Gadamer no interpretation is ever true, because all interpretations include the prejudices of the interpreter.

30.    Gadamer argues that we can achieve true interpretations only by getting rid of the prejudices that guide thoughts.

 

Multiple Choice

 

31.    Plato defines knowledge as justified true belief. In terms of this definition, we might be able to claim to know something as true which might actually be false, but it is impossible for us really to know something that is false, because:

(a) to know something that is false is to know no real thing, nothing (i.e., not to know at all).

(b) what we know as true is ultimately based on what we claim to know as true.

(c) we cannot give a justification or reason for believing in something that is false.

(d) in contrast to our knowledge of the unchanging Forms, beliefs about particular objects can change.

 

32.    Which of the following IS NOT a necessary characteristic for saying that Mary knows that today is Monday?

(a) It must be, in fact, true that today is Monday.

(b) Mary must be able to give a reason or justification for thinking that today is Monday.

(c) Mary could not have been tricked into thinking that today is any day other than Monday.

(d) Mary must believe that today is Monday.

33.    To say that I know that today is Monday, I not only have to believe it and have reasons for believing it; it must also, in fact, be true because:

(a) whenever I claim to know something (e.g., today is Monday), I have to rely on the testimony of others.

(b) if it is true that today is Monday (as it, in fact, is), then I cannot be misled into thinking otherwise.

(c) if today were not Monday, I would not know an actual thing: in short, I would know nothing, no thing.

(d) unless I have consulted a calendar I will not believe others when they tell me that today is Monday.

 

34.    To say that you know that there is life on other planets necessarily implies that you believe there is life on other planets, that you have reasons to back up your belief, and that:

(a) life on other planets is perhaps vastly different from what we are used to.

(b) you can trust your senses when you see extraterrestrial life forms.

(c) you have experienced life on other planets personally.

(d) there is, in fact, life on other planets.

 35.    In order for me to know that birds fly, it must be true that birds do fly, because:

(a) if it were not the case that birds fly, then I would know that which is not true; in short, I would know no thing: I would not know.

(b) whenever I claim to know something, I have to rely on what I have been taught.

(c) if it is true that birds fly (as it, in fact, is), then I cannot be mislead into thinking otherwise.

(d) unless I have seen birds fly I will not believe others when they tell me that birds do, in fact, fly.

36.    In the correspondence theory of truth, the proposition "There is a desk in this room" is true only if:

(a) I think there is a desk in this room.

(b) it is reasonable to think that there is a desk in this room.

(c) there is a desk in this room.

(d) if I try to sit on what I think is the desk, it will support me.

37.    Critics charge that the correspondence theory of truth fails to explain what truth is because it fails to explain:

(a) how we can compare our beliefs with actual states of affairs or facts in the world.

(b) why so many people would differ about what is true or false.

(c) how some of our beliefs can be true even though we are unaware of that fact.

(d) how many of our beliefs are consistent with one another and can be acted upon with satisfying results.

38.    "Suppose we say, 'the table in the next room is round'; how should we test this judgment? In the case in question, what verifies the statement of fact is the perceptual judgment that I make when I open the door and look. But then what verifies the perceptual judgment itself? . . . To which the reply is, that a judgment of fact can be verified only by the sort of apprehension that can present us with a fact, and this must be a further judgment." Here

(a) Bertrand Russell defends the correspondence theory of truth against the pragmatic theory of truth.

(b) Brand Blanshard defends the coherence theory of truth against the correspondence theory of truth.

(c) the Indian philosopher Dharmakirti defends the pragmatic theory of truth against the coherence theory.

(d) William James defends the correspondence theory of truth against the pragmatic theory of truth.

39.    Critics charge that the coherence theory of truth is unable to explain falsehood, because if truth is defined as the coherence of a proposition or belief with other propositions or beliefs, then are not all coherent systems of belief true? That is, if a belief is true because it is consistent with other beliefs in a system, then:

(a) how do we tell whether a proposition is inconsistent with other beliefs in that same system?

(b) can't a belief be false and yet the whole system with which it is consistent still be true?

(c) why can't judgments that are consistent with many other beliefs still be false within the same system of beliefs?

(d) couldn't the whole set of consistent beliefs be false?

40.    According to Bertrand Russell, to say whether two propositions are coherent, we have to determine whether they are consistent with one another according to laws of logic. But laws of logic (e.g., the law of contradiction, which says that something cannot be and not be at the same time) must themselves be true based on facts, not on their coherence with other beliefs, because:

(a) a set of propositions could be coherent with one another even though the whole set is false.

(b) apart from such laws, we would be unable to tell whether or not two beliefs are coherent.

(c) the truth of a proposition depends on how well it is consistent with or "coheres" with other beliefs.

(d) although laws of logic are not true or false, they define truth and falsity by identifying facts.

 41.    According to the coherence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it is consistent with a set of mutually supporting propositions. Critics (e.g., Russell) claim that this means that false propositions could be considered true as long as they are consistent with other propositions in a whole set of false propositions. To this criticism, the coherence theorist replies:

(a) just because one proposition in a set of propositions is false, that does not mean that the whole set of propositions is false.

(b) a proposition is false only if it is inconsistent with other propositions.

(c) a set of propositions cannot be internally consistent without also being consistent with all other sets of propositions.

(d) to say that a whole set of propositions is false is simply to say that the set is inconsistent with a larger set of propositions.

 42.    Which of the following IS NOT a typical objection raised against the pragmatic theory of truth?

(a) Beliefs are not true because they work; they work because they are true (apart from their usefulness).

(b) Because a belief could "work" for some people and not others, its truth would be purely relative.

(c) If acting on a belief consistently satisfies our expectations (i.e., it works), then it is true.

(d) Some beliefs might be justified (because acting on them can satisfy our expectations) and still be false.

 43.    The three standard theories of truth discussed in epistemology are the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories.  Which of the following descriptions DOES NOT match any one of these three?

(a) A belief is true if, when acted upon, it results in the satisfaction of expectations.

(b) A belief is true if it is consistent with other beliefs we hold.

(c) A belief is true if it describes the way the world is.

(d) A belief is true if a person really wants it to be true.

44.    Against those who say that knowledge must be based on indubitable principles or sense experience, critics of foundationalist epistemology (e.g., Richard Rorty) instead suggest that by knowledge we should mean:

(a) what we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent truth about the world.

(b) the interlocking set of unchanging a priori (innate) ideas implicit in reasoning itself.

(c) whatever an individual wants it to mean, as long as it "works" for him or her.

(d) a set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.

45.    Against those who attempt to discover some all-inclusive (capital T) Truth "out there," Richard Rorty and other critics of a correspondence theory of truth suggest that by truth we should mean instead:

(a) a set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.

(b) what we know in virtue of the unchanging a priori (innate) ideas implicit in reasoning itself.

(c) a set of beliefs that are based on indubitable (undoubtable) principles.

(d) what we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent facts about the world.

46.    Scientific instrumentalists argue that theoretical entities (e.g., atoms) are practical means for making predictions and do not describe things that exist apart from theories. In this sense, instrumentalists are more like:

(a) coherence truth theorists than pragmatic truth theorists.                      

(b) realists than correspondence truth theorists.

(c) conceptual relativists than realists.

(d) pragmatist truth theorists than correspondence theorists.

 47.    Scientific realists seem to assume a correspondence theory of truth, in that they argue that claims about theoretical entities (e.g., gravity, electrons) are true only if those claims:

(a) correspond to our other "prejudices" about the world.

(b) describe things that really exist in the world.

(c) describe those things without using scientific equipment.

(d) are useful in predicting how our ideas correspond to things.

 

48.    By claiming that theories are intended to describe the world as it is, scientific realists assume a:

(a) coherence theory of truth.

(b) pragmatic theory of truth.                                                                                                            

(c) correspondence theory of truth.

(d) a hermeneutic theory of interpretation.

49.    For conceptual relativists, claims about reality are intelligible only in terms of the theoretical frameworks in which observations and predictions are made. For example, claims about electrons are true only if such claims are:

(a) consistent with other accepted beliefs and practices.

(b) known--that is, beliefs that are both true and warranted.

(c) about things whose characteristics are said to exist independently of being described by any theory.

(d) conceivable as existing independently of any theoretical description.

 

50.    In his version of cognitive relativism, Richard Rorty suggests that instead of trying to discover some truth "out there," we should recognize that by truth we mean:

(a) a set of beliefs that are supported by a theory or an explanation.

(b) our personal beliefs, regardless of what others in our society or those in other societies believe.

(c) what we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent facts about the world.

(d) a set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.

51.    According to Schleiermacher, our interpretation of a text is true if it expresses:

(a) what the text would mean in an ideal language.                       

(b) the same structure of facts that exist in the world.

(c) what God understands the text to mean.

(d) the meaning that the author intended.

 52.    Wittgenstein's shift from his "picture theory" of meaning to his doctrine of "meaning as use" marks a shift:

(a) from a coherence theory of truth to a correspondence theory of truth.

(b) from a correspondence theory of truth to a pragmatic theory of truth.

(c) from a pragmatic theory of truth to a coherence theory of truth.

(d) from a conceptual relativist theory of truth to a realist theory of truth.

 

 

Answers:

 

1.        B

2.        B

3.        A

4.        A

5.        B

6.        B

7.        B

8.        B

9.        B

10.     B

11.     B

12.     B

13.     A

14.     B

15.     B

16.     B

17.     A

18.     A

19.     A

20.     A

21.     A

22.     A

23.     B

24.     B

25.     B

26.     B

27.     A

28.     A

29.     B

30.     B

31.     A

32.     C

33.     C

34.     D

35.     A

36.     C

37.     A

38.     B

39.     D

40.     B

41.     D

42.     C

43.     D

44.     A

45.     D

46.     D

47.     B

48.     C

49.     A

50.     C

51.     D

52.     B