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Before advancing his own hylomorphic account of soul-body relations, Aristotle rather dutifully canvasses the theories proffered by his predecessors, considering in the first book of his De Anima the materialist views of various Presocratic philosophers, most of which he decries as in one way or another explanatorily inadequate, and the view of Plato, which he regards as somehow baroque. Along the way, he reflects also on the view that the soul is a harmony or attunement of the body — something which is in some sense non-identical with the body but also not completely separate from it, perhaps something emergent from the elements of the body and their relations. This view too he rejects. His doing so is, however, curious: of all the views he considers, the harmony theory comes closest to his own hylomorphism. Indeed, from at least one perspective, one might think that it is his own hylomorphism, or at least entailed by it. The question thus lies near: what is the difference between hylomorphism and the harmony theory, such that the criticisms undercutting the harmony theory do not at the same time scathe the hylomorphism?